Globalization: Will China Change the World? by Kato Hiroyuki
Globalization: Will China Change
the World? 
                                                                                                                   
Hiroyuki KATO
Abstract
 
This article illustrates the current status of a globalizing China and discusses the 
effect of the rise of China on the global economy as well as its consequent changes. 
Globalization in China should be put in perspective from a historical point of view in 
order to gain a correct understanding of the changes taking place in China now. In the 
past, China was one of several core regions in the world, and there seems little doubt 
that it will reclaim this status in the near future. However, in order for China to regain 
and maintain its core-region status, China needs to shift from a resource-/energy-
intensive, foreign demand-dependent development model to a resource-/energy-
conserving, domestic demand-led development model. 
Keywords
globalization, China’s “resurgence”,  reform and opening-up policy, market transition, 
uncertainty in the global economy, development model, paradigm shift
Introduction 
China has been steadily globalizing since the reform and opening-up policy was 
implemented in 1978. In the 30 years since the reform and opening-up policy was 
implemented, foreign companies have flocked to China, which prompted the country 
to catch up with global standards in various areas such as corporate governance, the 
legal system and business practices. In other words, the world has changed China in 
the past 30 years. However, it might be China’s turn to change the world in the next 
30 years. While the rise of China and other emerging economies has the potential 
to bring about unprecedented prosperity to the global economy, this is increasing 
uncertainties on many levels by posing a heavier burden on the environment, causing 
conflicts over resources, clashes between developed countries and developing countries 
in the developing markets, and instability in the global financial system.  This series 
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of changes suggests a possible paradigm shift in which the global economic order and 
market economy rules created by developed countries are completely overturned and a 
drastic change in the global economy takes place.  
This article illustrates the current status of a globalizing China and discusses the 
effect of the rise of China on the global economy as well as its consequent changes. 
Globalization in China should be put in perspective from a historical point of view in 
order to gain a correct understanding of the changes taking place in China now.  In 
the past, China was one of several core regions in the world, and there seems little 
doubt that it will reclaim this status in the near future.  However, in order for China 
to regain and maintain its core-region status, China needs to shift from a resource-/
energy-intensive, foreign demand-dependent development model to a resource-/energy-
conserving, domestic demand-led development model.  
Section 1 reviews the process of China’s globalization in the 30 years of the reform 
and opening-up policy.  Section 2 highlights the uncertainties that China has created for 
the global economy.  Section 3 discusses the significance of China’s “resurgence” from 
a historical point of view.  
1. Globalization and 30 Years Since the  Imple-
    mentation of the Reform and Opening-Up Policy
Policy of Opening-Up to the Foreign Investment 
The bold policy of opening-up to foreign businesses is one of the pillars of the reform 
and opening-up policy.  While the Chinese government requested loans from foreign 
governments and international institutes, it put forward a policy to actively attract 
direct foreign investment by establishing four “Special Economic Zones” in Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shantou (all three in Guangzhou Province) and Xiamen (in Fujian Province) in 
1980 to serve as bases for the policy of opening-up to the foreign businesses (Hainan 
Province was also designated as a Special Economic Zone later).  Special Economic 
Zones served not only as an export processing base, but also as an entrance to accept 
foreign capital and technology.  Foreign business could enjoy preferential tax treatment 
and the government heavily invested in social infrastructure projects in the Special 
Economic Zones. Fourteen coastal cities were opened to foreign investment in 1984, 
followed by the opening of Yangtze, Zhujiang and Minnan deltas as well as Liaodong 
Peninsula and Shandong Peninsula.  Regions subject to the policy of opening up to 
foreign investment expanded from localized points to wide-ranging areas.  In 1992, the 
middle and upper reaches of the Yangtze river and remote inland areas followed suit, 
and China entered a phase of “all-round opening up” in which the entire nation opened 
up to foreign investment.  
The reform and opening-up policy was highly successful. The accumulated direct 
7foreign investment amount reached 942.6 billion dollars by the end of 2009 on a 
settlement basis (but more than 90% of this was investments made no earlier than 
1991). In addition to aggressive preferential tax treatment for foreign companies by the 
government, the ability to offer a low-cost processing base for companies from Newly 
Industrized Economies (NIEs) and Japan’s struggle with the rapid appreciation of the 
yen since the Plaza Accord in 1985 contributed to this success.  In particular, South 
China, where Fujian Province and Guangdong Province, which are close to Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, are located, attracted a large number of foreign companies mostly 
engaged in “contract proces-sing”1 Other export promotion policies were implemented 
along with a wider acceptance of foreign investments, including the devaluation of the 
yuan and the introduction of a system that allows companies and local governments 
to reserve foreign currencies.  China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 symbolized the 
integration of China into the global economy. 
Furthermore, the government made a transition from the fixed exchange rate 
system to the managed floating system in 2005 as exports steadily increased.  China 
had employed a system in which the Yuan was pegged to the Dollar for many years, 
but managed a transition to gradually appreciate the Yuan.  As a result, the Yuan 
appreciated by approximately 25% against the Dollar by 2010. 
Increasing Connection with International Market 
In 2010, China surpassed Japan in GDP to become the second largest economy in the 
world after the United States.  Advances in the areas of trade and direct investment 
are especially remarkable.  Based on the statistics of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), China’s share in the global trade increased dramatically from 1% in 1980 to 
10.5% in 2010 on an export basis.  
One of the indexes to measure the progress of globalization is a shift in trade 
dependency (the ratio of exports and imports to GDP).  Countries with large GDP 
usually have low trade dependency, but China is an exception.  The trade dependency 
of China grew steadily from 9.8 % in 1978 to a record high of 66.5% in 2006 (Japan’s 
trade dependency was 31.7% as of 2008), although it started to fall after that partly due 
to the government’s intention to expand domestic demand. 
China’s advance is particularly of note in its relations with Asian and African 
countries.  Table 1 shows the top 20 countries in terms of dependency on China for 
trade (the ratio of trade with China to total amount of trade). It is understandable that 
neighboring countries such as Mongolia (52.3%), Kyrgyzstan and North Korea are 
at the top of the list, but it deserves particular mention that African countries such 
as Sudan, Benin, Angola and Togo also rank high.  The number of the countries and 
1 The process in which all raw materials and equipment are provided by foreign investors and all of 
the processed products are exported while local manufacturers only earn processing fees. This was 
prevalent in Guangdong Province. 
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region whose trade with China accounted for more than 20% of their total trade was 
three in Asia and one in Africa in 2001, but this number increased to ten in Asia and 
eight in Africa by 2009.
Table 1:  Trade Dependency Ratio to China   
                         Note: Ranking in parenthesis is that of 2001 excluding Taiwan.   
                             Source: Nikkei Shimbun, July 18th, 2010.                
China’s foreign investment rapidly grew since the government had adopted a policy 
to promote China’s foreign investment (the so-called “going-out” policy) in 1999.  In 
2008, China was ranked 24th in the world in terms of direct foreign investment balance 
(excluding the financial sector) at 183.97 billion dollars, and was ranked 11th  in the 
world and second in Asia behind Japan (ranked 6th) on an international balance of 
payments basis at 53.47 billion dollars.
China embarked on a mission to grow global companies that can be successful in 
the international market, and has attained some progress.  According to a breakdown 
by country of the 500 largest companies in revenue compiled by Fortune in 2009, 
China was ranked 5th at 37 companies (including 3 companies from Hong Kong) 
following the United States (140 companies), Japan (68 companies), France and 
Germany. Also, the list of top 10 companies in total market value as of June 2010 
includes four Chinese companies: Petro China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, Mobile and China Construction Bank. 
        
            ranking                  country/region         ratio
        1         (3)      Mongolia      52.3
        2         (1)      Hong Kong      48.7
        3        (20)      Kyrgyzstan      46.8
        4         (6)      North Korea      39.2
        5         (2)      Sudan      38.4
        6        (48)      Benin      35.3
        7        (17)      Angola      30.1
        8      (102)      Togo                               28.7 
        9         (4)      Macau      28.5
      10        (59)      Solomon Islands      27.7
      11          (9)      Myanmar      25.0
      12        (64)      Mauritania      24.7
      13       (129)      DR Congo      24.4
      14       (163)      Tajikistan      22.5
      15          (5)      Gambia      21.9
      16         (11)      South Korea      21.6
      17         (28)      Kazakhstan      21.4
      18         (10)      Japan      20.5
      19         (39)      Congo      20.0
      20         (16)      Australia      19.6
9Not only big firms, but an increasing number of IT and green business entrepreneurs 
are listed on the US stock market.  In 2010, 41 Chinese companies went public in the 
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, and the amount of raised capital reached 3.9 
billion dollars, up 80% from the previous year.  Chinese firms accounted for 27% of all 
the companies listed in the US stock market in the same year.2 
Market Transition Promoted by Opening-up Policy 
The development of the opening-up policy inevitably has a direct and indirect impact 
on the reform of the economic system.  China set the “socialist market economy 
system” as a model to be aimed at, but this is not fundamentally different from 
economic systems adopted by developed capitalist countries.  China is considered to 
have completed its market transition in a narrow definition3 around the year 2000.4 
China’s system gives the government more room to directly or indirectly intervene in 
the market compared to developed capitalist nations, but private firms, foreign based 
companies and state enterprises are fiercely competing against one another in both 
domestic and international markets.  
Figure 1 shows the presence of foreign firms in the manufacturing sector. Foreign 
capital based companies, which did not exist in China before the introduction of the 
reform and opening-up in 1978, accounted for 18% of all companies, 30% of industrial 
output, 26% of total assets and 29% of the number of employees in 2008.  These 
figures show that foreign firms play a significant role in the manufacturing sector in 
China.  Also, they account for 56% of Chinese exports in amount. 
The significance of the rapid growth of foreign companies outweighs these figures. 
They brought global standards into China in various areas including corporate 
governance, the accounting system and business customs.  Chinese domestic companies 
complied more closely with the global standards as they faced fierce competition from 
foreign companies.  The opening-up policy propelled globalization at the corporate 
level and served as a driving force to accelerate market transition.  
2 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (5 January 2011).
3 The market transition in a narrow definition here means one satisfying two following conditions: 
1) most of means of production are owned by privately and the private sector accounts for a large 
portion of GDP, and 2) the market is a dominating adjustment system of economic activities. 
However, China does not completely meet the condition of 1) as state-owned firms still occupy an 
important position in the country.
4 Hiroyuki Kato, Toru Kubo, Shinka Suru Chugoku No Shihonshugi [China’s Evolving Capitalism] 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009).
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Figure 1: Share of Foreign Enterprises in Industrial Sector (2008) 
Note: Public-owned enterprises include state-owned enterprises, state sole funded enterprises 
and collective-owned enterprises. Foreign enterprises include Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macau enterprises. Enterprises are those with annual revenue from principal business 
over 5 million Yuan.  
Source: The author calculates figures from China Statistical Yearbook 2009.
2. Uncertainty Created by a Rising China 
China has already begun to exercise influence in various fields of the global economy, 
but it is not clear yet whether this will reinforce the existing order of the global 
economy or will cause a realignment of the global economic order.  The only thing 
certain at this point is that the rise of China has increased the amount of uncertainty in 
the global economy. 
Conflicts Over Resources 
China, having achieved rapid growth, emerged as a consumer of resources in the global 
market.  Consequently, it sometimes fought with developed countries over resources 
and caused the rise and volatility of resource prices.  Also, a long-practiced convention 
in resource price determination was broken by China.  Furthermore, China’s rather 
high-handed approach in securing resources is causing a political backlash from 
developed countries.  Oil and iron ore are representative examples of this. 
Figure 2 shows the trend of production and imports of crude oil in China.  China is 
an oil-producing country and its oil output was 190 million metric tons in 2009.  As of 
1990, China was 100% self-sufficient in crude oil, and its domestic output was enough 
to satisfy domestic demand.  However, it started to import crude oil in the mid 90s as 
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domestic demand grew.  Imports steadily increased to a level that exceeded domestic 
production.  According to future forecasts, China’s foreign dependence on oil will rise 
to 64% by 2020, as its crude oil production is expected to peak at around 200 million 
metric tons whereas import will continue to grow.5  A stable supply of oil is a crucial 
element for the sustainable development of the global economy, but the rise of China is 
complicating this. 
Figure 2:  China’s Crude Oil Production and Import (10,000 ton) 
Note: Import through custom only, excluding ships and airplanes filling out of border. 
Source: The author calculates figures from China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 2007, 
and China Statistical Yearbook several years.
Meanwhile, the rise of China is also posing new issues not observed before in steel 
manufacturing and its raw material, iron ore.  China is the world’s biggest crude steel 
producer.  Its crude steel production was 568 million metric tons in 2009, accounting 
for 46.6% of the global total.  It is also one of the biggest iron ore producers in the 
world with an output of 700 million metric tons (however, the figure adjusted to 
correspond to the world average is 332 million metric tons due to the steel being of low 
quality, 2007 figures).  China ranks first in the import of iron ore because of booming 
domestic demand. In terms of import volume in 2007, China was ranked first at 383 
million metric tons and Japan was ranked second at 139 million metric tons.  The sum 
of the two countries accounted for 61% of the global total.  
An interesting point is that China broke the traditional convention for determining 
the international price of iron ore.6  For over 20 years, the international price of iron 
ore had been decided after Vale, the world biggest miner, and Nippon Steel, the 
biggest customer had had thorough discussions over the price for  around three months
5 People’s Daily (29 July 2009).
6 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (21 July  2010).
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while taking into account each other’s business environment. The negotiation between 
these two companies is called a “benchmark negotiation”, in which the benchmark 
price is decided through negotiations between the leading buyer and seller in the 
market.  Other leading miners and resource companies then followed the price agreed 
to in the above negotiations.  However, Vale unilaterally declared that it would 
discontinue such business practices and shift to a quarterly pricing system based on 
spot prices from 2010.  In the new method, its quarterly iron ore price is matched with 
the market price of the latest three months.  The market price, which replaced the 
benchmark negotiation price, is the spot price of iron ore produced in India for export 
to China. 
Thus, the rise of China brought a substantial change to the pricing system of iron 
ore.  Securing a stable source of resources became a new policy challenge for China, 
especially because it needs to hedge price volatility.  State-run companies are requested 
by the government to boost the acquisition of mines and resource development 
companies but such moves are creating a backlash from developed countries.7
　
Clashes in Developing Markets 
Chinese firms’ expansion to foreign markets is prominent in the resource and energy 
fields, and their rapidly increasing presence in developing markets is causing frictions 
with developed countries.  This is typically observed in the African market. 
China began to strengthen its relationship with African countries in earnest when it 
hosted the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in October, 2000 which led to regular 
meetings between those parties.8  China’s motives for strengthening relations with 
African countries include the political tug-of-war with Taiwan, but its main motive 
is to secure natural resources and markets for products made in China.  In 2008, 
crude oil comprised 69% of all items imported from Africa, and ore including iron, 
manganese, chrome, copper and diamond comprised 12%. In bilateral trade, 70% of 
imports from South Africa were mineral resources including iron ore and precious 
stones such as platinum and diamond, 90% of imports from Congo was crude oil, and 
more than 80% of imports from Zambia were refined copper (the figures in 2009). 
7 In 2005, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) proposed an acquisition of Unocal 
Corporation, an American oil and gas company, at 18.5 billion dollars, but the American government 
rejected the acquisition insisting that the Chinese government tried to obtain assets across the world 
with an iron fist. In 2009, Chinalco, a Chinese aluminum group firm, tried to invest 19.5 billion 
dollars in Rio Tinto, a leading Australian resource company, but the plan collapsed as a result of 
political opposition from Australian side: The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (6 August 2010).
8 Imamura, Hiroko, “Saidai No Hatten Tojokoku No Keizai Gaiko” [Economic Diplomacy of the 
Biggest Developing Country],  in Kato, Hiroyuki and Uehara, Kazuyoshi, Gendai Chugoku Keizai 
Ron [Modern Chinese Economy] (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2011), pp.279-296.
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Meanwhile, the main items exported to Africa are miscellaneous products for day-
to-day use and household appliances such as clothing, shoes, toys, motorcycles, 
telephones and watches.  Contract work for infrastructure construction such as roads 
and bridges is also rapidly increasing.
Friction with developed countries is not noticeable as of now, but China’s sharply 
increasing presence in the African market will inevitably affect developed countries’ 
firms entering into the market and the way their governments provide economic aid. 
According to a survey of Japanese firms that entered the African market conducted 
by JETRO (from July to September, 2007), 45.9% of them answered that they were 
affected by the intensifying competition with Chinese firms and products, which 
implies that China’s presence is becoming a threat.  China’s influence in the African 
economy can also be seen as a blistering criticism on developed countries, especially 
former colonial powers, which have extended economic aid to Africa for many years. 
Moyo, who is critical of developed countries’ aid to Africa, argues as follows: “Western 
countries provided aid to Africa and did not care about the results. This created 
vested interest groups and excluded a vast number of people from wealth, which led 
to political instability.9  On the other hand, China sent cash to Africa and demanded 
returns.  The returns improved the lives of the African people by providing jobs, roads 
and food.” 
Fragile Economic Recovery Dependent on China  
The Chinese government announced a public investment of 4 trillion Yuan ($585.5 
billion) in immediate response to the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers, and was 
quick to achieve a V-shaped recovery in the first half of 2009. There is no doubt that 
China’s V-shaped recovery contributed to putting the global economy back on the track 
of recovery while Japan and other countries were suffering from the global recession. 
This marked an emergence of an image of “China saving the world”, but is China’s 
economic growth sustainable? 
First, from a short term perspective, economic management that is overly dependent 
on public investments will reach a limit, and accumulating non-performing loans 
could cause the burst of an economic bubble. China itself is well aware of the need to 
lessen its dependence on foreign demand and investment, and increase dependence 
on domestic demand from private sectors, but it has not created a new model that 
would replace the preceding successful model.  Also, it was reported by a newspaper 
that about one fifth of the 7.7 trillion yuan in loans from commercial banks to local 
government banks had problems, and that non-performing loans with problems in the 
9 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009), p.159.
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borrower’s paying ability or collateral amounted to about 1.54 trillion Yuan ($ about 
225.4 ).10   
Second, the sustainability of growth should be discussed from a mid-to-long term 
perspective.  The rise of China and other newly industrialized economies is generating 
huge demand for resources and energy, and it is posing a threat to the environment 
worldwide.  Global carbon dioxide emissions in 2008 were 29.5 metric tons and the 
total of the US, Russia, India and China exceeded half of the global total at 51.7%. 
China, whose per capita income was only 3400 dollars, already had the largest carbon 
emissions at 22.1% of the world total, far ahead of the US, which was in second place 
at 19.2%.  
Concern toward the global environment has been rising in recent years, and the 
burden on the global environment is already beyond an acceptable level.  According 
to the calculations of the “ecological footprint”11 in 2002, the US had the highest 
value at 5.5 (meaning it would take 5.5 planet earths to support the world population 
if everybody had the same lifestyle as American people), Japan was at 2.4, and even 
the global average was at 1.3 indicating that more than one planet earth is required. 
It is obvious that our planet will not be able to bear the burden of China and other 
newly industrialized economies if they were to follow the production and consumption 
patterns adopted by developed countries. 
Vulnerability of the Global Financial System Underscored by China 
As Iwai pointed out correctly, the instability of global capitalism is rooted in “the crisis 
of the US dollar” as a key currency.12  The value of the dollar is maintained as almost 
all market participants trust and accept the dollar as a key currency.  China, a country 
that has not liberalized exchange rates, supports the dollar by spending massive foreign 
reserves to purchase it.  This structure is not desirable for China and definitely not 
healthy in terms of the stability of the global financial system. 
China’s foreign reserves started to increase not so long ago.  They totaled $105 
billion in 1996, but started to rapidly swell around 2000, and grew to $3.2 trillion as of
10 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (8 August 2010).
11 The ecological footprint is defined as the total 1) forest area needed to absorb carbon dioxide 
emissions from fossil fuel consumption 2) land used for roads and buildings 3) land required for 
food, and 4) land needed to produce paper and wood, under the assumption that everyone on the 
planet enjoys the same living standards of each country: Ryutaro Otsuka, “Hyakuoku Nin Jidai Wo 
Do Mukaeruka” [How We Face the Age of Ten Billion Population], in Norihiko Fukai, ed., Kobo No 
Sekaishi 20 [Rise and Fall of the World History 20], (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2009), pp. 71-120.
12 Katsuhito Iwai, Nijiuisseiki No Shihonsyugi [Capitalism in the 21st Century] (Tokyo: Chikuma 
Shobo, 2000).
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the end of August, 2011.13  Obviously, this means that China is bearing a huge risk of 
dollar depreciation with its immense foreign reserves.  In early 2011, Chinese President 
Hu Jintao criticized the current US dollar based financial system saying, “the current 
international currency system is a relic of the past”, and expressed strong dissatisfaction 
with the current situation in which US monetary policies could have a substantial 
impact on the Chinese domestic economy.14  However, no matter how unhappy China 
is with the current financial system, it is not possible to replace the US dollar with the 
Chinese yuan. 
In the past, Japan and Germany also had purchased large amounts of US treasuries 
over a long period of time and maintained the value of the dollar in the same way that 
China does now. In that sense, today’s China partly resembles the Japan and Germany 
of the past, but it should be noted that China’s foreign reserves in recent years far 
exceed those of Japan and Germany in the past. The ratio of US dollar reserves to GDP 
of Japan and Germany from 1955 to 1975 did not exceed 2%, but that of China today 
is over 12%. Also, the ratio of foreign currency reserves to GDP of Japan and Germany 
then was a little over 5 %, while that of China today exceeds 50%.15  Furthermore, 
Japan started to see an increase in net external assets after the end of the high economic 
growth period in the 1980s, while China is already experiencing it in the midst of high 
economic growth unlike Japan.  
Securing the stability of the current global financial system holds significance for 
both China and the global economy.  Does China have enough economic power to bear 
the responsibility it carries?  If it does, can we expect China to behave the same way as 
Japan and Germany?  The answers for these questions are not clear yet. 
3. Significance of China’s “ Resurgence” from a 
    Historical Point of View 
The analysis of the preceding sections has made clear the fact that China has steadily 
globalized since the reform and opening-up policy, and the consequent rapid increase 
of its presence brought certain types of uncertainties to the global economy.  This 
 
13 The traditional rule of thumb for foreign currency reserve adequacy is one year short-term debt 
and three month’s exports on a practical level.  According to this, China only needs 350 billion to 
370 billion dollars based on its performance in 2010. 
14 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (17 January 2011).
15 Weiying Zhang, “Jingti Xiayici Weiji” [Watch out for the Next Crisis] in Weiying Zhang, ed., 
Jinrong Weiji Hou De Zhongguo Jingi [The Chinese Economy after the Financial Crisis] (Shanghai: 
Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2010) pp.80-85.
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section takes a slightly different angle and discusses the world historical significance 
of China’s globalization by reframing the current prosperity of China from a historical 
point of view.  
Three Phases of Long-term Economic Development 
Table 2 shows the longitudinal shift of GDP distribution of the world’s major regions.16 
The transitions that the world’s economic core regions went through in the recent 300 
years can be seen from this chart.  From 1700 to 1820, China’s GDP ratio to the global 
total grew by more than 10% up to 32.9%. However, Europe also showed a slight 
increase in its ratio, so it is not correct to say Europe had been stagnant. Meanwhile, 
India’s ratio fell by a large margin. 
  1700 1820 1952 1978 2003
China 22.3 32.9 5.2 4.9 15.1
India 24.3 16.0 4.0 3.3 5.5
Japan  4.1   3.0 3.4 7.6 6.6
Western Europe 21.9 23.0 25.9 24.2 19.2
U.S.A.   0.1   1.8 27.5 21.6  20.6 (%)
Table 2: Shares of World GDP, 1700-2003 
Source: Maddison, Angus, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run  (OECD: 2007), 
p.103.
According to Sugihara, the first phase of development was from 1500 to 1820, 
and Europe and Asia took different paths to development.17  Although interdependent 
relations existed as silver, which was found in the New World, flowed into China and 
affected price levels, the two paths did not converge. However, East Asia, especially 
Japan and coastal areas of China, developed as much as Europe and maintained a per 
capita GDP that stacked up against that of Europe.18
The second phase of development is from the early 19th century, when the Industrial 
Revolution caused a great upheaval, to the first half of the 20th century.  Industry 
spread throughout Europe and a European settlement (The United States) to form the 
16 Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run: 960-2030, 2nd Edition (Paris: 
OECD, 2007).
17 Kaoru Sugihara, “The East Asian Path of Economic Development,” in Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi 
Hamashita and Mark Selden, eds., The Resurgence of East Asia (New York: Routledge, 2003), 
pp.78-123.
18 Saito argues: “if a paid worker from a typical household in a rual part of England in the latter half 
of the18th century is compared with a farmer from a typical household in an agricultural village of 
East Asia, then the farmer’s disposable income, and not his real wage, would be about 10% higher 
than the latter in the case the latter was a tenant farmer, and it would be about the same as that of the 
latter in the case that the latter was a land-owning farmer: Osamu Saito, Hikaku Keizai Hatten Ron 
[Comparative Economic Development Theory] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008), p.186.
Year
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transatlantic economic region.  Table 2 shows a significant decline in the ratio of China 
and India’s GDP to the global total while Europe and the US came to the forefront. 
The ratio of Europe and the US’s GDP to the global total in 1952 was an overwhelming 
56.8%.  As indicated by K. Pomeranz, “the Great Divergence” emerged between 
Europe (the United Kingdom) and China (Yangtze river delta), both of which had been 
following the path of development.19
Even today, there is much controversy over why the Industrial Revolution occurred 
in Europe but not in Asia.  Several factors including the following have been discussed: 
only Europe had exclusive access to the resources in the New World; cheap fuel (coal) 
was available in the UK; the wage level was high and capital was relatively plentiful 
in Europe before “the Great Divergence”, which promoted the development of labor-
saving and capital-intensive industries; and the difference in natural geographical 
conditions created the difference between the decentralized governance of Europe and 
centralized governance of China.20
While Europe and China showed “the Great Divergence”, Japan developed in a way 
unique among Asian countries. Sugihara sees Japan’s experience of the pre-war period 
as a successful example of labor-intensive industrialization.  In other words, Japan 
underwent a process to catch up to Europe independently by successfully developing 
industrial products suitable for Asia where labor force is relatively abundant, such as 
cotton textiles and noodle-making machines. However, Sugihara argues that the growth 
of Japan’s GDP share in the global economy was limited because its labor-intensive 
industrialization was behind that of Europe in terms of labor productivity. 
The third phase of development refers to the period from the second half of 
the 20th century to today. Japan succeeded in heavy industrialization in the unique 
international environment of East Asia and became one of the global production sites 
for the manufacturing industry.21 Then, production sites gradually spread from Japan 
to Asian newly industrialized economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore) and 
eventually to ASEAN countries as well as coastal regions of China in line with the 
flying geese pattern of development. China joined the trend from 1978 when the reform 
and opening-up policy was introduced, and rapidly pushed up its GDP share in the 
global economy. 
Would the rapid growth of East Asian that started in the latter half of the 20th
19 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
20 Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing (London: Verso, 2007); Jared Diamond, Guns, Germsnd Steel: 
the Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
21 Sugihara indicated that the structure of the Cold War between West and East created an external 
environment for industrialization in East Asia, saying that “Asia-Pacific zone dynamics and the Cold 
War regime complemented one another in a mutually defining way as the Cold War regime ensured 
a trade order whereas the growth in East Asia symbolized the superiority of the West and encouraged 
the US to specialize in the military industry,” Sugihara op. cit., p.28.
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century and accelerated by the rise of China create “the Great Convergence” of the 
disparity between Europe and Asia originally caused by “the Great Divergence”? 
Theories and experimental studies of economic growth theory support this conclusion. 
Based on the neo-classical growth model formulated by R.Solow and developed by 
P.Romer, under the assumption that “technology is a public good,” 22 a country with a 
lower per-capita income at the beginning grows faster and all economies will “converge” 
to a steady state23 Some experimental results show that the “convergence” would not 
happen among all countries but only among a group of countries that share the same 
conditions considering that each country has different personnel and material resource 
stocks. Either way, there is no doubt that the process of former developing countries 
catching up with developed countries took place in East Asia.  
How Should the “Resurgence” of China be Interpreted? 
If what Sugihara calls the third phase of development continues to keep the current 
momentum, the economic map of the world will be significantly redrawn.  According 
to a long term forecast by Goldman Sachs, China’s GDP will exceed that of the US in 
2041 and exceed the US GDP by 26% by 2050.  By then, the economic scale of BRICs 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) will be 55% larger than that of the G6 (the 
US, the UK, Japan, Italy, Germany and France).24
The advance of China is especially remarkable among rising emerging economies. 
A.G. Frank interprets the rise of China as its “resurgence”, saying that “the world 
is about to reorient (from West to East) as China begins to prepare for taking the 
dominant position in the global economy which it had lost for a while since 1800.”25 
Apart from whether or not the long-term forecast by Goldman Sachs is accurate, 
many agree that China’s economy will catch up to that of the US in size in the not 
too distant future.  The question is the significance of this.  As Frank himself admits, 
the “resurgence” of China is not simply the theory of “Sino-centrism” replacing the 
theory of “western-eurocentrism”.  Even if the world reverts to what it was in 1820, 
22 Refers to the assumption that technology level is approximately same in all countries throughout 
the world and the same products can be made anywhere if the same amount of real capital and labor 
are invested.  
23 This model assumes a linear economic growth, but economic structural changes could lead to a 
non-linear path.  In that case, verification to test the hypothesis of “convergence” would not make 
sense: Tokuo Iwaisako, “Keizai Seicho No Jissho Kenkyu” [Experimental Study of Economic 
Growth], in Takatoshi Ito and Tetsushi Sonobe, Kozo Henka Wo Tomonau Higashi Ajia No Seicho 
[Growth of East Asia with Structural Change], Keizai Bunseki [The Economic Analysis] (No. 160, 
January 2000), pp.59-92.
24 Dominic Wilson, Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050”, Goldman 
Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 99 (October 2003) at <http://www.goldmansachs.com/
ceoconfidential/CEO-2003-12.pdf> (searched date: 18 April 2012).
25 Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), trans. Beicheng Liu, Ziben Baiyin, Zhongshi Jingji Quanqiuhuazhong De 
Dongfang (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2008), p. 3.
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China would not be the only center of the world but merely one of several core regions. 
However, it is too optimistic to believe that China’s advance will not shake the existing 
world order as J.Anderson argues, because increasing uncertainties caused by the rise 
of China can be seen as signs that the world order of “western-eurocentrism” centered 
around the US has begun to change, as discussed in the previous section.26
The advance of globalization enhances the interdependence of the world more than 
ever.  Given this situation, what would the reemerging multipolarized world look like 
and what kind of role would a “resurging” China play in such a world? 
Sugihara pointed out the following two implications of the third phase of 
development in the context of global history.  First, resurgence and expansion of the 
East Asian development model would be able to terminate global income expansion. 
Second, it could contribute to retaining and promoting resource saving technologies.27 
Sugihara focuses on the fact that the spread of industrial development from Western 
Europe to East Asia alleviated the widening income disparity between Western 
countries and non-western countries, and that the East Asian development model is 
superior in terms of resource efficiency with its use of labor-intensive technology.
China should be included in the third phase of development.  However, does China’s 
development pattern represent what Sugihara calls the East Asian development model? 
G. Arrighi, based on Sugihara’s study, lauds China’s development pattern saying that it 
is not a mere replication of the Western development model but “is mainly dependent 
on internal accumulation of wealth and focuses on mobilization of personnel resources 
[…] a development model based on the domestic market.”28
Indeed, China’s development centered around the manufacture of labor-intensive 
products dependent on low cost labor.  Its dependence on labor intensive technology 
can be regarded as a characteristic of the East Asia development model which is 
different from the Western development pattern. However, China’s development pattern 
can hardly be seen as resource-saving, the second condition by Sugihara.  Rather, it is 
generally assessed as an extensive resource consuming way of development.29  Also, 
although the internal accumulation of wealth and the domestic market surely played 
roles in the process of development, foreign capital brought in by opening-up and the
international market (especially the US market) played even more important roles.  In
26 Jonathan Anderson, Shenhua Zouchu, Zhongguo Bu Hui Gaibian Shijie de Qige Liyou [Escaping 
from Myth: Seven Reasons that China would not Change the World] (Beijing: China Citic Press, 
2006).
27 Kaoru Sugihara, Ajia Taiheiyo Keizaiken No Koryu [The Rise of the Asia Pacific Economy] 
(Osaka: Osaka University Press, 2003).
28 Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing (London: Verso, 2007), p. 389.
29 According to the international comparison of the amount of primary energy supply per GDP in 
2007, when Japan is normalized to 1, the US is at 2.1 and China is at 8.3: Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Energy White Paper 2010, at <http://
www.meti.go.jp/english/press/data/pdf/20100615_04a.pdf> (searched date: 18 April 2012). 
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this respect, Arrighi’s assessment seems to reflect only one side of the reality of China. 
These discussions illuminate the problem. That is, China’s development pattern so 
far represents a mixture between what Sugihara argues as the characteristics of the 
third phase of development and what he argues is not.  China’s further development 
according to the current model will not fit the East Asian development pattern which is 
different from that of Western Europe.  Neither does it seem to be sustainable.  Jinglian 
Wu, one of representative Chinese economists, has been insisting from an early stage 
that a shift in development model is necessary.30 He also mentioned that the shift in 
development model would pose considerable difficulties, but this article will not touch 
upon this.31  What should be emphasized is that China’s growth will be sustainable and 
its “resurgence” will become a reality only when China succeeds in the shift to a labor-
intensive, resource and energy saving, domestic market-based development model, 
which is what Sugihara calls the East Asian development pattern. 
The Near Future ― Two Scenarios 
In the mid-to-long term, it is highly probable that a Western Europe centered global 
economy will be replaced by a new world order in which several core regions coexist. 
The US dollar based financial system will remain for a while, but the current global 
financial system will be forced to go through a significant change in the mid-to-long 
term.  Also, an energy consumption pattern will shift from one in which consumption 
is dominated by one billion people in developed countries to one in which consumption 
is shared by four billion people including those from China, India and other emerging 
economies.  The current industrial and consumption structure will be forced to change 
fundamentally during this process.  
The question is what scenario prevails in the near future in the process of forming 
such a new world order. In a desirable scenario, the transition to create a new world 
order having China as one of several core countries will happen smoothly.  In a less 
desirable scenario, emerging economies will continue to employ the resource and 
energy intensive development pattern. Consequently, there would be increasing 
conflicts and friction over resources and markets, and uncertainty in the global 
economy would grow to the point that the economic order is destroyed.
30 Jinglian Wu, “Zhongguo Jingji Zhuanxing De Kunnan Yu Chulu” [Shift of the Chinese Economy’s 
Difficulties and Solution], Zhongguogaige [Chinese Reform], No. 2 (February, 2008), pp. 69-71. 
31 The need for such shift was already discussed in 1995, but it did not happen. Jinglian Wu mentions 
three reasons for that.  First, each level of government has authority to allocate important resources. 
Therefore, a large portion of land and other production factors is allocated not through the market. 
Second, GDP growth is used as a major index of policy evaluation by each level of government. 
Third, financial income of each level of government is largely dependent on value added tax. Thus, 
the government has to focus on the development of the manufacturing industries whose performance 
directly affect the amount of value added tax.
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Which scenario takes place depends upon the future direction of China’s 
globalization.  Our world cannot simply exclude China for being a cause for 
uncertainty. The world has already reached a phase in which there is no choice but to 
integrate China into its system.  China is indispensable as it provides a huge market 
for developed countries and serves as a supplier of inexpensive consumer goods and 
an intrepid investor for developing countries.  However, the more important China’s 
sustainable growth is for the global economy, the longer it might take for China to shift 
from the current development model, because an extensive development model is more 
likely to generate extensive growth.  The world will not change unless China changes. 
A paradigm shift will be inevitable in the mid-to-long term, but the path for it is still 
unclear at the moment.
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